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Political Decay in Somalia: 
From Personal Rule to Warlordism 
Daniel Compagnon 
The Somali people's high expectations 
after SiadBarrels oppressive regime was 
overthrown in January 1991 have since 
turned into bitter disillusionment and 
mass suffering. According to some UN 
reports, 4.5 million people in Somalia are 
facing a food shortage and 1.5 million 
will starve in the coming months. In May 
and June 5,000 children under the age of 
five died daily1 and 7,000 people died in 
Baydhaabo in June. The case of the 
interriverine region exemplifies how the 
famine is a direct outcome of political 
internal strife and lawlessness: the 
farmers interviewed in the Bardeera area 
explained that the Mareehaan militias of 
Siad Barre looted their herds, water 
pumps and sowing seeds several times, 
while those of Baydhaabo said they were 
looted by United Somali Congress (USC) 
gunmen as weL2 This human disaster is 
probably the largest one in Somali 
history and beyond anythtng that could 
have been foreseen even two years ago 
when Siad Barre was still in power. 
Those who bear the main responsi- 
bility are the Somalis of the various 
factions who cultivate warfare and 
mafia-type behaviour. The lack of 
concern shown by foreign powers, 
despite their involvement in Somali 
politics during the last thirty years, 
accounts for the international 
community's low-scale initiatives, 
especially in contrast with the attention 
focused on other parts of the world 
(Yugoslavia or Cambodia). But it is also 
quite clear that the lack of far-sighted 
leadership and political planning on the 
so-called "liberation fronts" are crucial 
factors in the Somali crisis. In addition, 
historical as well as sociological factors, 
some of them deeply rootedinthe Somali 
social fabric, have to be taken into 
consideration. 
Daniel Compagnon teaches at the Centre du 
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Paris, France. 
The rapacity of the political 
entrepreneurs and their impatient drive 
to secure state power at any cost, added 
to the preexisting factors of political 
decay and clan-based factionalism, are 
all part and parcel of Siad Barre's legacy. 
The Bitter Legacy of Personal Rule 
The analytical notion of personal rule is 
designed to capture a contemporary 
style of governance well represented in 
Africa3 that combines authoritarian rule, 
a low level of institutionalization of 
political processes (including decision 
making), concentration of power in the 
hands of the ruler, and private 
appropriation of state resources through 
corruption, patronage and prebends? 
Siad Barre's regime evolved from an 
original pattern of bureaucratic- 
authoritarian rule in the early 1970s 
towards personal rule in the 1980s and 
eventually into its corrupt variety called 
"sultanism" (i.e., when the ruler makes 
no attempt to restrain from the abuse of 
f~ rce ) .~  This type of governance had 
major negative effects in Somalia and 
provide the background of the current 
crisis. 
Economic Ruin Through 
Patrimonialism 
This patrimonial dimension6 developed 
under Siad Barre's regime to an extent 
unknown in the 1960s, and the Ogaden 
war might have been a turning point in 
this respect? Embezzlement of public 
funds, corruption of ministers and civil 
servants in connection with public 
markets and development projects: 
baksheeshes at all levels of the 
bureaucracy, illegal trafficking by 
relatives or friends of the president-4 
these were tightly linked to a direct access 
to state power. These were the spoils of 
personal rule. Patron-client ties were 
built between those who had that access 
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and others, especially Hawiye busi- 
nessmen. With the absolute power to 
appoint, transfer, sack or even jail, Siad 
Barre was the ultimate boss of the whole 
network His personal patronage was 
eagerly sought for and he got his share in 
the biggest deals. Somalis used to say 
that Siad Barre looked at the national 
state and economy as "parts of his tea- 
shop." This patrimonial behaviour 
enlarged the group of people who had a 
personal interest in the continuation of 
his devastating rule? 
It alsoimplied that investment capital 
was predominantly oriented towards 
speculative trading activities and all 
kinds of illegal trafficking detrimental to 
the productive side of the economy.1° A 
stratum of wealthy and corrupt busi- 
nessmen (many of whom were penniless 
in the early 1970s) arose from all the clans. 
As the economic crisis deepened and the 
power circle narrowed down to the 
ruler's family, and while the unleashed 
repressive bodies (the National Security 
Barre's downfall. Interestingly, some of 
those who benefited financially from the 
previous regime were in thebest position 
to make money from the looting. 
State Disintegration 
Despite prominent officers in the state 
hierarchy since 1969, from the top down 
to the remote rural districts, the apparent 
backbone of the military regime was 
never able to act against the will of Siad 
Barre, let alone depose him. From the 
beginning, he viewed the officers either 
as his personal clients or as his personal 
foes." 
The army, whose support was a 
crucial political resource for imposing an 
authoritarian state in the 1970s, was 
perceived as a threat after the abortive 
coup of 1978. Through purges, 
accelerated promotions of Mareehaan 
and (to a lesser extent) related Darood 
clan officers, while the military from 
other clan families were transferred to 
By the time the opposition f i n &  were able to take over; there was 
no state as such to seize, and they were not prepared to provide 
an altematc've to prevent anurchy. 
Service, Hangash, some army units and 
Red Berets) raised the level of violence 
and extortion to such levels that they 
provoked a massive displacement of 
populationin the North and the eventual 
uprisingin the South, the leading officials 
of the regime completely plundered the 
state budget and the banking system. In 
this respect, the looters who have been 
ravaging the capital city since January 
1991 are the heirs of Siad Barre and his 
clique for three reasons: 
The first to loot were Siad Barre's 
RedBerets and other military units at the 
bottom of the hierarchy and his 
patrimonial servants at the top. 
The country was bankrupt and food 
shortages had already begun during the 
summer of 1990. For impoverished ur- 
ban dwellers and destitute nomads, loot- 
ing became the only means of survival. 
There was no moral restraint (the 
Somali crisis is also spiritual) as robbery 
became a way of life even before Siad 
administrative positions, Siad managed 
to keep the potential hostile elements of 
the armed forces at bay. He never 
allowed the minister of defence to build 
a personal power position.12 The 
patrimonial nature of his policy was 
exemplified by interferences from 
members of his family in military 
appointments. Colonels and generals 
were part of the president's patronage 
network; they had to remain loyal to him 
and his close relatives, whether they had 
a command or were temporarily in the 
Cabinet.13 Inclusion in the regular army 
of the Ogaadeen, Warsangeli and 
Dulbahante militias to fight against the 
Isaaqs in the North and the creation of 
units exclusively drawn from the 
Mareehaans eventually discredited the 
very idea of a national army. 
The military apparatus offers a good 
example of Somali institutional decay as 
a result of the state's patrimonialism. 
Other examples of institutional decay 
include the diplomatic service since 
Abderahmaan Jaama Barre became 
minister of foreign affairs, cooperatives 
under Warsame Indolleh, finances and 
banking, etc. The state disintegration 
began long before the overthrow of the 
ruler. Since 1987 there has only been a 
semblance of a state: not a single public 
service was working effectively, the 
administration was paralysed by 
factional struggle at its head for the long- 
awaited succession and also by 
insurgency at the periphery. 
Hence, the random killings and 
systematic abuses of the Isaaqs in the 
North as well as the Ogaadeens in the 
Jubba area or the Hawiyes in the central 
regions,14 were signs that Siad Barre's 
regime had reached the stage of 
sultanism, a variant of personal rule 
characterized by arbitrary violence. By 
the time the opposition fronts were able 
to take over, there was no state as such to 
seize, and they were not prepared to 
provide an alternative to prevent 
anarchy. 
From the summer of 1988 onwards, 
there was a combination of political 
repression against targeted clans and 
private use of violence by predatory 
units and individuals of the former 
"national" armed forces--already in the 
process of disintegration-who used 
their power to rape, kill and loot freely. 
The classic distinction between private 
illegitimate violence and public coercion 
disappeared. Many former military men 
later joined the clan militias or the armed 
W'gs. 
Vendetta Politics and the 
Exacerbation of Clan Rivalries 
Another striking feature of Siad Barre's 
survival tactics in the 1980s, as many 
scholars have already noted, was his 
extensive use of clanism15 as a political 
resource. To secure lasting loyalties, he 
filled the key positions in the army, 
police, diplomacy and security force 
with members of three Darood clans 
closely related to his own reer: 
Mareehaans, Dulbahantes and 
Ogaadeens,16 yet the impartance of this 
alliance should not be exaggerated. 
Contacts with elders and the support of 
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some prominent men in the clan do not 
necessarily mean that the whole clan is 
behind the regime: other members 
exiled abroad couldbe engaging in some 
opposition activities at the same time." 
Siad Barre played on the segmentary 
social organization: while he was 
courting a subclan or a lineage that 
received prebends and honours, another 
branch of the same clan was given a hard 
time. On the other hand, many Isaaqs 
and Hawiyes served the regime until the 
late 1980s and were instrumental in the 
ruleis claim that he was still able, unlike 
the armed opposition, to rally significant 
support among the clans, a crucial point 
for his public image. 
Clanism also provided a means to 
weaken the opposition, which was 
accused of being tribal-minded. The 
Somali Salvation Democratic Front 
(SSDF) was labelled a Reer Mahamud 
organization in order to reduce its 
appeal, so that the regime would gain the 
support of smaller lineages of the 
Majeerteen clan. Siad Barre also played 
on the Hawiyes' resentment of the 
Majeerteens for their alleged domination 
of the Somali polity in the 1960s. 
Similarly, the Somali National 
Movement (SNM) was presented as an 
Isaaq chauvinist and secessionist group 
by Siad Barre's propaganda, skilfully 
using some elements of truth to damage 
the image of the whole movement. The 
ruler tried several times to stir up the 
rivalries between the main Isaaq  clan^,'^ 
in order to diminish the support for the 
SNMin the North. Furthermore, the state 
was involved in interclan feuds among 
the nomad pastoralists. By givingmoney 
and weapons totheclan segments whose 
goodwill he wanted to win, thereby 
weakening lineages hostile to his rule, 
Siad Barre repoliticized lineage 
competition, deliberately breaking with 
the postcolonial state's long-term efforts 
to appear neutral. In the late 1980s to the 
early 1990s some of these conflicts were 
deliberately instigated or encouraged to 
prevent discontented clans19 from 
forming a coalition. By doing so, the 
personal ruler sharpened clan rivalries 
and brought back clan-based faction- 
alism as a major factor in Somali politics. 
The actions of Siad Barre and his aides in 
creating the Somali crisis should not be 
forgotten too quickly. Nonetheless, his 
contenders and successors did not fare 
better. 
The Deadly Gamble of Political 
Entrepreneurs in the Post-Siad 
Barre Era 
According to press reports, Somalia is 
confronted with a tribal war, which 
suggests atavistic hatreds and endless 
conflicts. It is an inaccurate description of 
a segmentary society whose clan families 
are not differentiated along cultural and 
linguistic lines, and in which the 
disintegrative effects of personal rule. 
Although the SSDF (in 1981) and the 
SNM (between 1984 and 1987) got closer 
to this objective, their leaders either made 
mistakes that ruined the whole plan or 
showed that they were just paying lip 
service while calling for unity of the 
opposition. The United Somali Congress 
(USC) is no exception, since it was 
intended to voice the interests of the 
Hawiyes. Siad Barre's propaganda 
deliberately fuelled these clan rivalries, 
but the fact that these divisions persisted 
after his downfall shows that his 
machiavellianabilities were not the main 
factor: there are still very few Somalis 
None of these organizations, which claimed they were 
fighting against a dictatorship and for a democracy, 
had a clear vision of what should be done to establish 
such a regime and rebuild the country. 
competition between the segments is 
constantly reshaped by shifting 
alliances.20 It also falls short of explaining 
the various dimensions of the factional 
competition for supremacy. If Somalia's 
current upheaval was a traditional feud 
between neighbouring clans, it should 
have been possible to end it through the 
traditional h e r  and ~ h i r . 2 ~  
Shortcomings of the Former 
Opposition to Siad Barre's 
Regime 22 
From the early 1980s the Somali 
opposition was divided into rival 
organizations that were politically weak 
mainly for the following reasons. They 
recruited massively from a single clan or 
clan family, thereby limiting their appeal 
to other groups that were automatically 
suspicious of alleged clan hegemony. 
The clan factor was always at the core of 
Somali politics and played an important 
role in the factional struggle of the 1950s 
and 1960s, even within the nationalist 
parties. But in theatmosphere of growing 
fear and distrust in Siad Barre's Somalia, 
no single clan could achieve a violent 
overthrow of the regime because they 
had limited constituencies at the fronts. 
The regime actually collapsed due to the 
who have a political vision that extends 
beyond asserting their own clan rights 
and strength. Another consequence of 
this kind of recruitment was the 
formation of military units along the 
lines of social segmentation at the level of 
the primary lineages. This later 
facilitated the lineage-based factionalism 
within the fronts. 
There was no coordination of 
activities, especially military cooper- 
ation, between the armed fronts. Hence, 
the Majeerteen resented the lack of 
support when they were under attack in 
the Mudughareabetween 1979and1982, 
and the Isaaqs bitterly pointed out the 
lack of southern solidarity while they 
werebeing harassed andlater massacred 
by the regime's squads. "Let the noses of 
the Isaaqs be bloodied" was later 
countered by the vengeful "Let 
Muqdisho be destroyed as Hargeisa 
was."23 We can see today how counter- 
productive these attitudes were. 
Significantly, the exception here is the 
agreement signed in August 1990 
between the SomaliNationalMovement, 
United Somali Congress1 Aydiid and 
Somali Patriotic Movement 1 Ahmed 
'Umar Jess. The purpose of this alliance 
was mainly to preempt and share state 
power in the event of the fall of the 
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regime, especially in defiance of the other 
groups, the Manifesto, Somali Salvation 
Democratic Front and USC/'Ali 
Wardiigle y. 
None of these organizations, which 
claimed they were fighting against a 
dictatorship and for a democracy, had a 
clear vision of what should be done to 
establish such a regime and rebuild the 
country. The paucity of their political 
programs was probably intended to 
diminish their leaders' responsibilities 
during the transition period, but it also 
denoted a lack of careful analysis of the 
Somali crisis. The simplistic slogans 
brandingthe "bloodthirsty dictator" and 
the "bankrupt regime" were indeed 
useful for mobilizing support, but fell 
short of providing a model for 
governance." 
Since the overthrow of SiadBarre, the 
clan-based politico-military organi- 
zations appeared exclusively motivated 
by the struggle for supremacy and the 
sharing of the spoils. The war that 
devastated Muqdisho from November 
1991 to March 1992, killed as many as 
14,000 and injured twice this number, 
according to Africa Watch, cannot be 
explained otherwise. But even in the 
North, where the SNM enjoyed several 
months of peace and unchallenged 
political hegemony, nothing decisive 
was achieved. This can be explained by 
the lack of resources, the lack of coherent 
plans to rebuild the country, and, above 
all, by the factional competition within 
the SNM, which reached a peak during 
the serious fighting in Burao and 
Berbera. 
Rival Entrepreneurs, Merchants 
and Clan-Based Factionalism 
In May-June 1991 the Manifesto group 
was an attempt to prevent civil war and 
clan fighting after the collapse of Siad 
Barre's regime, but the group disbanded 
at the time it was most needed. Also, 
from the beginning some of its leaders 
had their own agenda and the race for 
power began as soon as Siad Barre left 
the capital city. A national reconciliation 
government failed to appear because the 
USC, which officially controlled 
Muqdisho, was not able to prevent the 
massacres of Darood civilians and other 
non-Hawiyes. This can account for the 
rise of a pan-Darood alliance in early 
spring 1991, which came very close to 
conquering Muqdisho before it was 
stopped by USC troops. Clan rivalries 
rapidly evolved into open warfare when 
the state was perceived as an easy prey. 
The war between the clans seemed to 
revive the traditional competition 
between lineages for scarce resources, 
which was one of the fundamental 
characteristics of the precolonial pastoral 
society. However, differences between 
the current instability and the traditional 
pattern lie not only in the prizes (state 
split of USC dates back to the very 
beginning of the organization in January 
1989 when a group of mainly Abgaal 
people in exile in the Western countries 
elected 'Ali Osooble Wardiigley as 
chairman. The Sa'ads then decided to 
stay in the SNM that Wardiigley had just 
left and General Aydiid, long courted by 
the SNM leadership, joined them in 
Ethiopia. Then a USC unit was organized 
there in the spring of 1990 and from then 
on there were two Hawiye guerrilla 
movements fightingthe regime. Judging 
from the propaganda war waged outside 
the country between USC I Aydiid and 
USCIRome, and from the fierce 
The war between the clans seemed to revive 
the traditional competition between lineages for scarce 
resources, which was one of the fundamental 
characteristics of the precolonial pastoral society. 
resources including foreign aid, instead 
of pastures and wells) or the weapons 
(bazookas and artillery, instead of 
spears), but also in the role played by 
political entrepreneurs and merchants. 
The case of the self-proclaimed 
Republic of Somaliland illustrates the 
clan elders' ability to defuse the tensions 
at the local level between neighbouring 
lineages, especially during the first six to 
eight months of 1991. However, it also 
demonstrates their powerlessness in 
preventing factional fighting at the 
national state level. They are not able to 
impose their will on the incumbent 
leaders who are already largely 
discredited. 
Politicalentrepreneurs, whether with 
a military or a civilian background, rely 
on clan solidarity and clan chauvinism as 
political tools to achieve their goals. They 
use their own clan as much as they serve 
it (very much like Siad Barre did with the 
Mareehaans until he went into exile). 
Although the conflict between Sa'ads 
and Abgaals is reminiscent of some 
politicking in the 1950s when 
' Abdullaahi lire was mhkkr,it is 
still difficult to understand unless one 
considers the personal rivalry between 
Mahamed Farah Aydiid and 'Ali Mahdi 
Mahamed in their bid for power. The 
comments made in private onboth sides, 
one could tell that this factional rift would 
not be easily mended. Both factions are 
based on lineage alliances that formed 
during the fighting--currently Haber 
GidirIHawaadle versus Abgall 
Murursaade--but are cemented more 
effectively by personal loyalties and 
individual rewards. This may explain 
why a Salebaan general serves in 'Ali 
Mahdi's forces and a Murursaade 
businessman and former politician 
supports Aydiid. Although the clans 
provide young men for the struggle, their 
elders do not control the whole process. 
The political entrepreneurs are 
constantly trying to broaden the alliance 
on which they rely in order to strengthen 
their autonomy. It is precisely what 
Aydiid has been doing since he defeated 
Siad Barre in late April this year. 
The merchants also play a key role in 
the current upheaval, since they finance 
the war as well as the physical survival of 
the political entrepreneurs and their 
cliques. At the same time, they take 
advantage of the scarcity of food or the 
demand for khat and the large number of 
destitute and hungry looters to make 
huge profits.25 NOW that increased 
international aid is being delivered, they 
dictate their prices for transportation as 
-- - -- 
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well as for military protection. Their 
interest is so closely linked with the state 
of anarchy that they might be more 
willing to support warlords than invest 
in peace and reconstruction. Without 
their money to supply ammunition, buy 
back the loot and selectively feed the 
gunmen, the factions would have been 
unable to sustain themselves during 
eighteen months of unrest. 
Militarization of the Political 
Conflict: Warlordism in the 
Making 
The prolonged political squabble among 
various political parties and military 
fronts did not bring about any lasting 
government coalition capable of 
reconstructing the state. The competition 
between political entreprimeurs within 
each of the main groups, especially the 
uncompromising stands of the two 
factions fighting for Hawiye supremacy, 
has jeopardized the implementation of 
the Djibouti agreement of July 1991, the 
most notable effort at national 
reconciliation. The subsequent months 
of warfare and atrocities deepened the 
rift of distrust between the clans and 
strengthened the position of military 
strongmen (most of them former army 
officers) in each camp. 
Since there is no credible political 
settlement in sight and because there is a 
high level of insecurity in all the de facto 
autonomous regions, time seems to 
favour the warlords who will try to build 
their own mini-states in the areas they 
control. As the inevitable partners of the 
NGOs and international relief agencies, 
the warlords can extract more resources 
to reinforce their authority. Ironically, 
more humanitarian intervention might 
help them consolidate their power. They 
might be able to deliver the goods in 
terms of stability and minimum order, 
but they can scarcely be regarded as 
champions of democracy. Even the 
North might evolve along the same lines 
if the SNM leadership remainsinefficient 
and immobile and fails to reach a 
consensus. 
The threat of war will remain since 
none of the warlords will voluntarily 
renounce his claim to state power. When 
they make compromises, it is only for 
tactical expediency. This political culture 
is consistent with Somali traditional 
values and with oral poetry that praises 
dominance by force asserted in the 
battlefield and looting of those who are 
defeated.26 For many years, Somali 
politicians and the majority of scholars 
emphasized the "democratic" nature of 
the pastoral society and neglected this 
other side of its culture. Sayyid 
Mahamed 'Abdulle Hasaan, who was 
able to build an autocratic system of rule 
by using the resources of lineage politics 
and religious charisma, definitely 
remains a model for the modern 
warlords. 
The picture is extremely gloomy and 
I tend to believe that the only way out of 
the nightmare is to call for a full 
intervention of the United Nations, not 
only to establish peace in the country, 
preserve its unity and save the people 
from famine, but also to preempt the 
power and create a new democratic 
order to preserve equal rights for all the 
lineages and, if necessary, to quell the 
open resistance of the warlords-in other 
words, establishing anew trusteeship for 
Somalia. rn 
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